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Abstract
There is a mounting crisis in delivering affordable healthcare in the US. For decades, key decision
makers in the public and private sectors have considered cost-effectiveness in healthcare a top pri-
ority. Their actions have focused on putting a limit on fees, services, or care options. However, they
have met with limited success as costs have increased rapidly while the quality isn’t commensurate
with the high costs. A new approach is needed. Here we provide eight scientifically-based steps for
improving the healthcare system. The core of the approach is promoting the best use of resources
by matching the people and organization to the tasks they are good at, and providing the right
incentive structure. Harnessing costs need not mean sacrificing quality. Quality service and low
costs can be achieved by making sure the right people and the right organizations deliver services.
As an example, the frequent use of emergency rooms for non-emergency care demonstrates the
waste of resources of highly capable individuals and facilities resulting in high costs and ineffective
care. Neither free markets nor managed care guarantees the best use of resources. A different over-
sight system is needed to promote the right incentives. Unlike managed care, effective oversight
must not interfere with the performance of care. Otherwise, cost control only makes care more
cumbersome. The eight steps we propose are designed to dramatically improve the effectiveness of
the healthcare system, both for those who receive services and those who provide them.
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INTRODUCTION
The US healthcare system suffers from high costs and low quality compared to health-
care systems internationally [1,2,3], as measured by reported life expectancy [4] and infant
mortality [5]. High rates of nosocomial infection (infections acquired in healthcare settings)
as well as adverse drug effects (errors in the administration of medication) manifest the need
for improvement in the system of care. At a cost of $2.5 trillion annually [6] the system is not
delivering affordable, effective care. The paradox of higher costs and lower quality makes
clear the existence of a systemic problem. How can we fix it? Complex systems science
provides tools to address this question directly. In this paper we provide eight scientifically-
based steps toward reducing costs and improving quality. Our suggestions arise from an
analysis of the US healthcare system in particular, but they are broadly applicable when
adapted appropriately.
The eight steps are:
1. Separate simple care from complex care.
2. Empower workgroup competition as an incentive, and avoid regulating costs or quality.
3. Create superdoctor teams to rapidly diagnose and treat highly complex conditions.
4. Accelerate intake routing to rapidly identify the right provider.
5. Add redundancy to improve communication to prevent prescription errors.
6. Create disinfection gateways at spatial boundaries to reduce hospital-based infections.
7. Use e-records for research to supplement clinical studies.
8. Promote “First Day” celebrations to encourage healthy behavior.
Additional reading is available in the references provided at the end of the paper.
I. SEPARATE SIMPLE CARE
Scientific principle—Matching complexity and scale: For an organization
to perform tasks effectively, it must be organized so that it can match both the
scale (rate of repetition) and complexity (variety) of those tasks. When large
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scale tasks are performed by an organization designed for complex tasks, the
result is inefficiency. When high complexity tasks are assigned to an organization
designed for large scale tasks the result is non-optimal (wrong) acts, i.e. errors.
Separating tasks by scale and complexity enables simple, mass-applicable care
to be performed by individuals and organizations (retail clinics in this case) well
suited to those tasks, and complex tasks to be performed by individuals and
organizations (physician practices) designed for those tasks.
Healthcare work may be divided into two types: simple care, which is the same for many
people, and complex care, which is different for each individual.
Simple care includes preventive services, such as health screenings, vaccinations, and
healthy-habits counseling sessions. Complex care includes the individualized diagnosis and
design of treatment.
Physicians are specially trained to diagnose and treat complex medical conditions.
Nonetheless, one finds that physicians and their offices are typically responsible for sim-
ple, standard care in addition to complex, individualized care.
That poses a problem. Asking the same organizational structure to provide mass-
applicable preventive care and complex individual care is like asking an expert violin crafts-
man to provide all the chairs for a new concert hall. The mismatch between the organization
and the task leads to ineffectiveness and inefficiency.
Ironically, instead of streamlining the delivery of high-volume simple services, most cost-
reduction efforts to date have tried to make complex tasks simpler and faster. Industrial-style
efficiency is poorly applicable to doctors’ diagnoses and treatment of individual patients,
however. Trying to speed and simplify doctors’ work assembly-line style reduces doctors’
time to make complex decisions, which is not a good idea if we want doctors to be careful
and make the best decisions possible. At the same time, many healthy patients are receiving
insufficient preventive care, since doctors are being asked to provide many of these services.
The volume of preventive care needed is too great for the current system to handle it
effectively.
What can be done? The solution is to separate the tasks. Let doctors perform the
complex tasks that they do well, and delegate preventive-care tasks such as vaccinations to
an organization suited for simple, repetitive tasks.
In many hospitals and doctors’ offices, simpler tasks such as drawing blood and taking
x-rays are performed by professionals trained for these specific, frequent tasks. This idea
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can be applied much more broadly.
We can improve the healthcare system dramatically by separating the simple services that
many healthy people need even further, delegating them not just to different individuals but
to different organizations.
We are beginning to see this concept in programs that make flu shots available in super-
markets and airports, and in the growing number of retail clinics.
Since retail outlets at malls and supermarkets serve many people with similar needs,
retail clinics make sense; they can readily provide routine and preventive care such as health
screenings, vaccinations, and dissemination of public health information. These clinics have
the additional advantage of locating preventive services where healthy people frequently go,
rather than requiring them to make less convenient trips to their physician’s office.
CVS is installing MinuteClinics in its pharmacies. Walmart has such clinics at over 50
locations and is planning thousands. These clinics, originally developed to provide routine
treatment for minor problems such as strep infections, now also offer preventive services,
including vaccinations, cholesterol and other tests, and school physicals.
What is the payback in widespread retail clinics? To be sure, a retail setting offers
convenience and efficiency in implementing preventive care via large volume, simplicity, and
a focus on healthy people. Whenever a large number of similar tasks are to be performed,
the medical system is well-served by moving such care from physicians’ offices or hospitals
to the retail setting.
Besides easing the burden on doctors—freeing them for complex tasks for which their time
is now too limited—the separating-out of mass care from individual care would streamline
high- volume processes. This would address the excess costs that arise when the performer
and the task don’t match.
More people would gain access to routine care due to the convenience of location and
avoidance of the need to make appointments, travel to the doctor, and wait.
What is clear is that making preventive healthcare more accessible can reduce illness,
further easing the burden on the medical system. It is time for the medical and insurance
communities to embrace this solution.
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II. EMPOWER WORKGROUP COMPETITION
Scientific principle—Evolving complex systems: Highly complex systems
arise through evolutionary change that involves replication, variation and se-
lection. We can understand this in social learning as mimicry (replication),
creativity (variation) and competition based on comparative evaluation, i.e. per-
formance feedback (selection). Highly complex tasks cannot be performed by a
single individual (they exceed an individual’s complexity). It is not even pos-
sible for an individual to manage or design a system to meet the challenge of
high complexity. Instead evolutionary processes that provide for feedback and
learning of the group performing the task enable progressive improvement. Just
as team competition drives improvement in sports, competition between teams
of care providers enables improvement of outcome measures.
The current use of “managed care” to improve medical performance and reduce costs is
inherently flawed. To understand where the flaws lie, it’s useful to ask: What roles should
government, management and practitioners play in healthcare and in healthcare decision-
making? Today, they often serve in the wrong roles. That’s because they serve within
the wrong system structures. Neither traditional centralized management nor free market
competition scenarios work for healthcare and yet those settings are perceived as the only
two options.
Whether by government or by insurer, efforts to control healthcare costs are typically
deployed within a setting of centralized management to dictate how to allocate limited
funds. Yet healthcare is a highly complex system, and, as we see in the failure of the USSR
and other centralized economies, centralized control doesn’t work for complex systems.
At the same time, free-market competition, which may result in rapid improvements
for, say, the electronics industry, is ill-suited for managing healthcare. After all, patients
generally can’t shop around for the best hospital.
Are these the only two options?
There is a third: empowering workgroup competition. Groups of care providers who
together can be responsible for medical outcomes and other performance metrics compete
against other groups in the same hospital and between hospitals. Workgroups must become
teams in a peer competition to improve care. This team competition approach combines
the best aspects of both the free market and centralized management; it allows the spirit of
competition to spur advances and improve performance, while still allowing management to
set objectives.
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In free-market competition, the goal is financial gain. In workgroup competition, the
objective is to be a top performer according to carefully designed metrics that measure both
cost and quality. This kind of competition works for sports teams, students competing for
grades, and in other competitions where the goal isn’t just to make money.
In order for medical care to improve, the people engaged in providing that care, who
know the most about what to do, must be the ones who have control over care decisions,
and must be the ones with responsibility for outcomes. However, performance should not be
measured at the level of individual doctors and nurses, because outcomes often rely on an
entire workgroup’s performance—e.g., how nurses or physicians communicate information
across a shift change has a huge impact on outcomes, and communication relies on how
people work together.
How does a system empower the people who work together, and who can take on such
responsibilities—and not tell them what to do? Through workgroup competition. Fostering
workgroup competition means first identifying and solidifying groups that can be responsible
for outcomes. Nurses at a nursing station responsible for the care of patients in a specific
part of the hospital could be a workgroup, taking responsibility for improvement in areas
like infection rates and patient satisfaction. In many hospitals, nurses, technicians, and an
anesthesiologist are assigned to a surgery based on who happens to be available. In some,
however, each surgeon has his or her own team of nurses and techs, and an anesthesiologist
with whom he or she works. This team-based approach allows workgroup members to get to
know each others’ styles and to work smoothly together. A team approach also allows them
to improve their outcomes as a group. One emergency room, in the Washington Hospital
Center of Washington, DC, takes just such a team approach, dividing the emergency room
staff into teams who care for a patient from entry to release or admission to the hospital.
Workgroups must be of the right size and function to be able to improve based on the
measures evaluated. Some efforts have attempted to produce competition between entire
hospital systems, but these units are too large and unwieldy. They focus responsibility on
the hospital system management. Since these efforts do not directly measure workgroup
performance, they do not enable practitioners to take responsibility for their outcomes or
work together to improve their performance. Having provider workgroups rather than man-
agement assume the responsibility for healthcare performance in a competitive environment
is key. Once workgroups are created, the metrics of competition must be designed. Health-
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care administrators should determine workgroup-performance measures that cover health
outcomes, costs, lengths of hospital stays and patient satisfaction. Remember—what is
measured is what will be improved: performance metrics must be designed carefully, and
should be revisited periodically for updates and improvements.
Finally, workgroups’ performance on each of the measures should be publicized to all the
groups on a regular basis—say, monthly. The workgroups would compare their results with
those of other workgroups providing similar types of care, like other surgical teams or other
nursing stations, and then be responsible for their own improvement.
Care must also be taken to set an appropriate tone for the competition. Just as with
sports, rules must be established which will encourage good sportsmanship. Also, as teams
improve their performance, swapping team members among them causes better strategies
to be shared and improve the performance of all teams.
When workgroups’ scores are in focus, both the scores and the performance they measure
improve radically. Members of a workgroup will work together to improve their performance.
They will innovate, and they will emulate improvements that they see others adopting.
Some hospital systems publicize their performance measures so that consumers can com-
pare hospitals or systems. This won’t improve performance, however, because patients can’t
always change providers, and because hospital systems don’t have much control over their
practitioners’ performance.
Arranging hospital operations such that groups consistently work together, and then
identifying these workgroups and entering them into a spirited, friendly competition based
on well-designed performance metrics will lead to dramatic improvements in results.
Besides improving performance on the measures evaluated, workgroup competition will
change the way efforts to control healthcare costs are directed. We will move from a limited
focus on cutting healthcare costs to a broader focus on improving the healthcare system at
lower cost.
Why centralized management doesn’t work in healthcare:
• Decisions about care should be made by the people who understand the need for care,
the healthcare providers.
• The decisions must be made on a case-by-case basis. Abstractions according to gen-
eralized rules degrade the effectiveness of care.
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Why free market competition doesn’t work in healthcare:
• The consumer has limited knowledge of how well each hospital or doctor’s practice
works.
• The ability to choose is often limited by emergency circumstances, capacity of the
provider, insurance policies, or restrictions on changing providers.
Why team competition works:
• Professionals care about comparisons with their peers.
• They have the most knowledge and ability to improve outcomes.
• Team competition, like competition in biological evolution, is the natural way to im-
prove performance.
III. CREATE SUPERDOCTOR TEAMS
Scientific principle—Organizing for complexity: Systems must be orga-
nized for the complexity of the tasks that are to be performed. Specialization
enables a group of individuals to perform more complex tasks than an individ-
ual can do alone. It does so by routing different tasks to different individuals,
enabling them to perform a wider variety of tasks. The number of distinct tasks
that can be performed by the system of specialists grows linearly with the number
of individuals (it is the sum of the number of types of tasks each individual can
perform). However, a collaborative team enables each individual to contribute
a different dimension to the task performed by the group, so that the number
of types of tasks can be as high as the product of the number of tasks each
individual can perform. As there are increasing number of specializations, and
conditions that require multiple specialists to address, this implies that we have
reached the point in complexity of care that teams are increasingly necessary to
address complexity of medical care.
A hundred years ago, physicians were generalists, treating most medical conditions. Hu-
manity didn’t have nearly as much medical knowledge and knowhow back then so that for
the most part a single doctor could master what was known. That has changed.
Medical knowledge now far exceeds a single expert’s ability to master it. Medical students
receive a general training and then they specialize, seeking to learn just one small piece of
what we know about medicine.
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FIG. 1: Specialization reflects the growth in medical knowledge, which is much greater than an
individual’s capacity to master.
Specialists have become essential because of the complexity of care. The more we learn,
the more kinds of specialists are needed. Increasingly, however, it is necessary to have
patients see multiple specialists for a single problem, which causes fragmentation and delays
the care. Furthermore—and critically—the interplay between multiple causes of a single
condition, or multiple aspects of its treatment, makes it difficult for the separated specialists
to address such complex problems.
What is the solution?
A human being is a single working system and specialists must be able to work together
as an integrated unit for diagnosis and treatment. Specially constituted teams of physicians
and other care providers who work together on a regular basis should address the more
complex problems. The cost of having such a team in place might seem high, but for complex
cases such a team will prove to be more effective and less costly than the alternative—the
difficulties, delays, and costs inherent in multiple appointments. The challenge is making
sure the teams can work together smoothly and efficiently, and with better results than
specialists working separately.
A well-integrated team of specialist physicians can be thought of as a “superdoctor.” In
order for medical teams to be superdoctors, they must get to know each other’s strengths
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FIG. 2: A. The knowledge of specialists is brought to bear using a routing system. B. When con-
ditions require multiple specialists, multidisciplinary teams can provide integrated comprehensive
care.
and styles and act together seamlessly. Well- integrated teams have the combined specialized
knowledge of each member and more: they have the ability to relate these different domains
of knowledge and combine them in new ways. Moreover, they can act rapidly with this
combined knowledge. They can be an important part of the solution to the problems of
fragmentation.
Such teams have become standard practice in cancer care, where specialists in imaging,
surgery, radiation therapy, and chemotherapy often meet and work together to treat patients.
The wide diversity of cancers and of individual responses to treatment make the team
approach necessary for effective care. These teams generally also include non-physician
practitioners. While the team approach is most widely used for cancer, some medical centers,
recognizing the problem of fragmentation in care, are using the team approach for other
conditions.
To be most effective, superdoctor teams need to work together on a regular basis. If you
were to throw together several sports players—even professional athletes—to play as a team
without training together, they would not play as well as they would with team members
who they were used to. Similarly, medical teams must “practice” together to fully leverage
their collective ability.
We can take clues for the formation of superdoctor teams from the types of cases that
currently require many specialist appointments—teams should be formed that can handle
10
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FIG. 3: Distinct tones symbolize the distinct tasks possible for an individual or team to perform.
A. By separating distinct types of tasks, specialists can address many more conditions than a single
practitioner. B. Through joint action, teams can address an even more diverse set of conditions
than a similar number of specialists. The case shown is for two specialists and two-member teams.
these cases together more effectively than the specialists could working separately. The
advantage of the team is not just the ability to do what the individual specialists would
do separately; it’s the ability to treat a wide range of conditions effectively, to make very
subtle distinctions that are important for effective care, to solve the cases that are the most
difficult due to the interplay of multiple causes or complications.
The capabilities of superdoctor teams will grow through being challenged, and they will
learn from experience. Innovation in their composition and testing their abilities is key.
We can only discover their effectiveness through observing how they respond to challenges.
Measuring their effectiveness brings us back to Step II.
Superdoctor teams can assume the dynamics we described in Step II: Empower Work-
group Competition, competing against one another and continuously pushing the boundaries
to improve care and reduce costs. By measuring their performance, we can learn how to
build more and more effective teams, both in terms of choosing types of specialists to be on
a team and in their specific interactions.
It is important to note that, in trying to stem the cost of specialist care, alternative
cost-cutting approaches have been tried but have not been successful.
Some have proposed having primary care physicians treat more cases, to reduce the
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number of specialists that patients see as a way of reducing healthcare costs. This approach,
though at times politically popular, is ineffective. Family physicians can treat a certain set
of conditions, but they do not have the specific knowledge to treat many complex, more
specialized conditions.
Of course, we will still need primary care physicians—many problems are best treated
by a single person knowledgeable about a wide range of conditions. We also will continue
to benefit from individual specialists, or from specialists who don’t normally work together
collaborating for particular patients. This works fine for problems of intermediate complex-
ity.
However, for the increasing number of highly complex cases, superdoctor teams are nec-
essary for comprehensive, integrated, cost-effective, quality care.
We must take steps to form innovative specialist teams that can treat the most complex
cases successfully and cost-effectively. Introducing such teams is essential if we are to put
our vast medical knowledge to effective use.
IV. ACCELERATE INTAKE ROUTING
Scientific principle—Limiting rates for dynamic response: The rate of
response of a system is a key aspect of its ability to perform time sensitive
tasks (such as medical care). A system only responds as well as its rate limiting
step, i.e. the step that takes the longest time to perform. The current design
of the US healthcare system involves the use of “gatekeepers” who serve to
route individuals to the care they need. Evidence suggests that this task has
become the rate limiting step. The gatekeepers become overloaded, wait times to
see them are extended and the routing process itself often involves many time-
delayed steps. Improving the system behavior involves: explicitly recognizing
response time as a critical dimension of care, identifying the time of first contact
rather than the time of intake as the beginning of the medical response process,
expanding the set of gatekeepers to allow adequate parallel intake channels, and
improving the routing function to better utilize available channels of care that
work in parallel. These interventions also should reduce the complexity of the
initial intake process.
One of the strengths of our current healthcare system is that the critical task of routing
patients to appropriate specialists is performed by primary care physicians. They are also
often on call to respond to inquiries about urgent care or referral to an emergency room.
How patients are routed to appropriate care is a crucial aspect of running an efficient
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medical system. As we consider changes to our healthcare system, it is vital to note the
importance of accurate and timely routing, to focus resources on keeping this process reliable,
and to improve upon it where possible. Routing is known in medical circles as triage. Unlike
the triage in disaster or wartime, triage in a modern medical setting simply refers to the act
of directing patients to the appropriate care.
Today, most routing occurs in the primary care physician’s office or through the physi-
cian’s after hours call-in system. This process often works smoothly, with knowledgeable
family physicians, internists or pediatricians assessing patients in a timely manner and rout-
ing them appropriately. They may treat a patient directly or refer to an appropriate spe-
cialist or clinic.
When care is required after-hours and the PCP is not available, patients call a service to
reach the doctor on call. Some medical offices provide extended-hour urgent visits. Some
practices and insurance agencies also provide 24-hour phone access to medical professionals
through a “nurse line.” These call-in services can provide feedback to the patient as to
whether he or she should go to the emergency room, or whether their condition can wait.
However, the medical routing system doesn’t always work efficiently.
Individuals who are uninsured, or who do not have a primary care provider, often resort
to the emergency room for non-emergency care. Without a PCP to act as a router, and
without access to a 24-hour phone support, these individuals’ options are limited. If their
medical problem occurs at night, or if they can’t make it to a walk-in clinic during the clinic’s
hours because of work, childcare, or other responsibilities, the emergency room becomes the
only option. This puts a huge strain on the emergency care system, since a large portion
of its resources must be devoted to treating or routing these cases rather than on the truly
urgent ones.
Even for people with insurance and a PCP, the intake system often doesn’t work well. The
wait for an initial appointment with a family physician averages 20 days in the United States
as a whole. According to a 2009 survey, the average wait time to see a family practitioner
in Washington, D.C., was 30 days; in Los Angeles, it was 59 days and in Boston, 63 days.
This delay in the initial care and routing process indicates that something is amiss with
the intake system. The influx of patients seeking initial evaluation and referral to specialists
overtaxes the primary care system. What’s more, delays in diagnosis can have serious health
consequences.
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The initial triage decision often falls to the receptionist, who is generally unprepared to
properly make such decisions. When the doctor is too busy to see everyone who wishes to be
seen, the receptionist is put in the position of deciding which patients must be seen urgently
and which can wait for an appointment—an appointment that may be several weeks away.
No matter how good the care is once a patient gets to the right place, delays mean that the
healthcare system isn’t working well, not for quality of care, where delays may compromise
the patient’s health, and not for costs.
Even where the current routing system works well, it can be improved using advances in
technology. The advent of email and other forms of electronic information and communica-
tion have changed our expectations of response time. The medical routing system should
make use of these advances to build on the existing structure, speed response time and
improve outcomes.
Perhaps the best way to think about an effective rapid-response system is “Triage on
Steroids”... or “Super - 911.”
A routing service should be available 24 hours a day, seven days a week, and be performed
by a knowledgeable and capable medical professional. This is the gold standard of medical
routing. The system should be accessible via phone, Internet, and in person. Most of the
traffic should be handled by phone or electronically; for in-person routing, the staffed routing
site might be near to—but separate from—an emergency room, or perhaps at a pharmacy.
The first task of a routing service is to serve as a “super-911,” to identify emergencies
and reassure if urgent care is not needed.
Second, if it is not an emergency, the intake specialist could determine the complexity of
the response needed. Patients requiring a simple, standard response, especially preventive
care such as flu shots, could be directed to a preventive care clinic (see Step I). Patients
with more complex problems should be directed to their primary care provider or, where
the determination can be readily made and the primary care provider is otherwise overbur-
dened, an appropriate specialist. Finally, patients with especially complex problems might
be referred to a superdoctor team (see Step III).
To accelerate the appointments for an initial evaluation, some family practices are adopt-
ing a system known as “open access,” designed to facilitate routing and expedite care. In
an open access setting, no appointments (or only a limited number) are made significantly
in advance. Instead, patients call into the office when they require care and are given an
14
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FIG. 4: A schematic of an intake routing system.
appointment that same day. This system provides an opportunity for a very rapid initial
evaluation, allowing for routing decisions to be made literally hours after symptoms manifest.
There is another difficulty that could be addressed with creative use of new technology.
Often, the best person to determine whether a particular specialist should be seen is the
specialist himself or herself. But a patient moving from specialist to specialist to find out
who should provide treatment is not a good strategy. It is inefficient and potentially costly
in health consequences. One approach to solving this problem is to use information routing
rather than patient routing. The key is information-gathering and communication. Most of
what happens at an initial medical visit to a clinic or primary care physician is a gathering of
key information that will serve to determine which specialist should be seen. In information
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routing, after the initial visit, the information, not the patient, would be forwarded to a
number of specialists.
The specialists could rapidly evaluate whether, based upon this limited information, they
should be seeing the patient. Or, a specialist might provide a question—if the patient has
such and so a symptom or such and so a test result, then they should be seeing the patient,
e.g., “If the patient’s ears hurt while the other symptoms occur, she should see me. If not,
I’m not the right specialist for this case.”
This information-based routing system, on the specialist level, serves patients better,
and costs less, than patients being sent around to several specialist appointments in order
to route them correctly.
An “everywhere and always-on” routing system could be made available instead of the
more usual answering services, by primary care providers, provider systems or insurers. Such
a system would relieve emergency rooms of having to perform the routing of non- urgent
cases, freeing them to focus on the urgent and emergency care they are supposed to be
providing. This type of routing system would also relieve some of the burden of PCPs, and
shorten patients’ wait times for routing and treatment significantly.
It is clear that an accessible and reliable 24/7 accelerated triage mechanism—staffed
by intake specialists and augmented by an information-transfer system—will dramatically
improve our medical system’s cost-efficiency and ability to serve patients well. Wait time
for care will be dramatically reduced, emergency rooms will be put to their proper use, and
the burden on primary care providers will be lightened. Augmenting and improving our
existing routing system is crucial to improving healthcare quality for all.
V. IMPROVE COMMUNICATION
Scientific principle—Information theory, errors, and redundancy: Ac-
cording to information theory, adding redundancy to a message dramatically
reduces the error rate when it is transmitted through noisy channels. Human-to-
human communication can be analyzed as occurring through a communication
channel, whether oral, handwritten or through electronic means. Information
theory uniquely identifies the origin of errors and how to alleviate them. Errors
in the medical system that result from miscommunication can be analyzed using
this approach and the introduction of the necessary redundancy can be used to
drastically reduce medical errors. Prescription miscommunication has been doc-
umented as a major cause of loss of life and other adverse outcomes and should
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be addressed in this way. It is a common misconception that automation (elec-
tronic prescription systems) reduces error rates. This is incorrect, unless such
systems introduce the necessary redundancy specified by information theory.
Ten years ago, the Institute of Medicine’s report on the extent of serious medical errors
brought the issue to the attention of medical professionals and the public. According to the
Institute and the FDA, medication-related errors cause over 1 million harmful drug events
each year. Even one case of medical error may result in tragedy for those directly affected
and may be traumatic for the professionals involved.
How can this problem be solved?
First, it must be said that the often-suggested electronic prescription system is not the
solution to medication errors—unless the system is well designed. Research shows that
different electronic systems affect errors quite differently, ranging from eliminating 99% of
them to increasing the error rate and all possibilities in between. Moreover, these systems can
cause a variety of unanticipated side effects that compromise patient safety. This paradox
can be understood once the real sources of medical errors are understood.
For many errors, the solution lies in adding redundancy. What does this mean?
To explain, we can turn to another context where the prevention of errors is important:
writing checks.
Where money is involved, we are careful to make sure the information is conveyed clearly.
To this end, we write the amount twice, in both words and numerals. This is done, purely
and simply, to prevent errors. Electronic check-writing systems also make sure that critical
information is “double-checked.” Another example is the double entry of e-mail addresses
or passwords when one registers for online accounts. Why enter the same information twice?
To make sure it is correctly received.
The same principle of redundancy can and should be applied to writing prescriptions.
Why isn’t this done already? The system we use today for writing prescriptions was
developed when there were far fewer medications. As the number of possibilities increases
we have to be increasingly careful to make sure that enough information is communicated
so that the right prescription is delivered.
Thus, whether written or electronic, what matters is how well the system is designed.
The caveat is that every critical piece of a prescription must be written twice, to ensure
that few if any errors occur. There are five critical pieces of information on a standard
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prescription: Patient, Drug, Dose, Route (oral, intravenous, etc.) and Time. Each of these
must be written in two ways, or double-checked after electronic entry.
For example, the patient could be designated by both name and ID number. The drug
could be doubly specified by writing both the medication and the indication (the condition
for which it is prescribed), or both the generic and trade names. Dosage, route of drug
delivery, and time of administration could be written out fully and abbreviated, rather than
given only in abbreviated form.
For electronic systems, auto-completion and simple check boxes should be avoided. These
items are more prone to error precisely because they are quick and easy. Instead, it is
important to have the prescriber provide all key information longhand and verify it. Writing
something twice admittedly takes more time but the prevention of errors, as in writing
checks, must be considered of primary importance.
FIG. 5: Hitting the right target is harder when there are more targets. The more medications and
treatments there are, the more accurate the system has to be to avoid errors that shift from one
of the possible medications to another.
It is possible to write less when there is less potential for misunderstanding. For example,
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if the route is already determined by the medication, then the route can just be indicated
as “Standard.” For now, however, we should be conservative in shortcuts; once medication
errors are dramatically reduced, we can carefully study which efficiencies can be implemented
without errors being introduced.
Electronic systems also should be carefully designed to avoid distraction and disrup-
tion. The difference between a well-designed intuitive way of entering prescriptions, with
appropriate redundancy, and a poorly designed system is the difference between success and
failure.
Communication is not only central to prescription errors, but is also central to other forms
of medical errors. Errors generally arise not because of an individual’s action, but because
of the way individuals work together. Improvement of communication and coordination is
often the solution. The development and competition of workgroup teams recommended in
Step II are key to reducing errors throughout healthcare, because such groups can improve
local team coordination and communication.
In looking for ways to solve the problem of medical errors, improving upon the analysis
of the source of medical errors is important too. Too often, the process of examination only
looks at a specific error—what went wrong in this particular case—and a particular practice
is blamed, and a particular solution is offered to that practice. Instead, we should abstract
from the level of individual errors and find the patterns among effective and ineffective cases.
Focusing on just the individual error is as ineffective as a tennis player only practicing the
one last shot he or she missed, over and over. In most cases, it makes more sense to work on
improving speed, agility, and the player’s ability to respond to a large set of possible shots.
The next challenging shot will not be the same as the last one.
The same holds true for medical errors: understanding the many possible ways errors
can occur rather than just the last one, and the way things work correctly, will allow us to
recognize the weaknesses and improve the strengths of the system.
The Institute of Medicine originally reported up to 100,000 deaths per year due to medical
errors, and up to $29 billion in additional costs incurred. More recent reports have found
these numbers to be even higher. The price in human and financial terms is too great. We
can and must fix the problem.
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VI. CREATE DISINFECTION GATEWAYS
Scientific principle—Dynamics of well-connected versus modular net-
works: In many systems the difference between a geographically partitioned and
a well-mixed one is significant. In a well-connected system, the large number
of pairwise interactions makes highly likely the spreading of any transmittable
condition. Indeed, analysis shows that infections of high virulence and trans-
missibility only survive in highly connected systems. Understanding the flow
of contagion through a system involves mapping out the set of contact points
and the network of transmissions that result. Today the focus on reducing in-
fection transmission in hospitals is on reducing the likelihood of transmission
through each of the many individual contacts. However, because the system is
highly connected, the probability of transmission is high even when there is a low
individual contact transmission probability. Spatial, and more generally, hierar-
chical partitions are a powerful approach that reduces the overall connectivity
of the system and thus dramatically decreases the sustainability of infections,
inherently making the system non-conducive to highly virulent and transmissible
strains.
Infections acquired in hospitals, known as HAIs or nosocomial infections, are often re-
sistant to antibiotics and thus particularly dangerous. Each year, the estimated 1.7 million
infections cause nearly 100,000 deaths in the United States. Many patients in hospitals,
nursing homes and clinics become sicker from these infections than they were before they
sought care. These infections also play a significant role in costs—HAI hospital costs alone
were recently estimated at between $30 and $45 billion.
Current recommendations for reducing hospital-acquired infections target the patient’s
immediate environment and interactions with care providers. Hand washing by care
providers before and after patient contact is a key part of protocols in patient-focused
transmission prevention. The wide variety of other measures include identifying patients
who enter the hospital with infections for additional isolation, extra care to avoid catheter-
associated infections, and augmented surface sanitation—of bed rails and controls, light
switches, partition screens, faucet handles, and the like.
Collectively, recommended protocols have been shown to reduce transmission, are cost
effective and could be more widely adopted. Still, the attention and effort involved are
significant and progress in eliminating infections is slow.
Underlying the widespread prevalence and difficulty in addressing these infections is the
large number of contacts between care providers and patients. Because there are so many
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contacts, the effort involved in making every contact safe is huge and this effort burdens
already busy care providers.
How can we speed up progress?
We need to expand our view beyond the point of contact between patients and providers
to think in terms of the overall process of transmission within a hospital and between care
facilities.
Each transit across a boundary between domains should be considered as a potential
“transmission” of pathogens that will infect a unit, ward, floor, building or care facility. At
these boundaries, protocols of disinfection should be designed to reduce pathogen transfers
from one domain to another. The boundaries between domains should be like airlocks,
disinfecting people and objects that pass through them.
What protocols should these boundaries have? Since there are relatively few such cross-
ings as compared to the number of patient contacts overall, we can consider more extensive
decontamination procedures than just hand washing, such as clothing sanitation and the
cleaning of cell phones and other personal effects. There is evidence that lab coats, PDAs,
cell phones and the like act as repositories for pathogens, and can be responsible for HAI
transmission. The protocol should still be efficient, and it can be. Staging such inten-
sive interventions at the gateways could significantly reduce the flow of pathogens between
patients.
We have to consider how pathogens are transferred: from one patient to the surfaces and
fabrics near that patient to the care providers and their clothing, cell phones and pagers.
From there the pathogens are transferred either directly to another patient or to the fabrics
and surfaces in common areas or around that patient from which they eventually reach that
patient at a different contact opportunity.
Most of the possible transmission events happen because of the large number of contacts
within a local ward between patients and doctors, nurses, medical technicians, food service
people and cleaning staff. Each of these contacts has the potential to transfer pathogens
between patients, and to contaminate objects in shared spaces, such as computer keyboards.
If there were no virulent pathogen in the ward in the first place, none of those possible
transmission events could actually transfer virulent pathogens. Using boundary protocols to
reduce transmission between wards would eliminate a large number of potential transmission
events among the individuals within each ward.
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FIG. 6: A mockup of a disinfection gateway for use in inhibiting the spread of infections.
With the use of boundary protocols, there would be a reduction not only in the trans-
mission of existing pathogens but also in the emergence of new resistant strains. The high
number of physical contacts makes medical care facilities a uniquely fertile environment for
pathogens to evolve into more virulent strains. By blocking the spread of infection between
areas, we can cut down on the appearance of virulent pathogens as well as their prevalence.
Would everyone have to go through disinfection at these airlocks? Visitors and patients
entering a hospital for an appointment don’t present the same level of risk (though they might
be tested for infection themselves). Unlike care providers who go from patient to patient to
patient, they don’t act as agents for transmission. Accordingly, the same protocols need not
apply. Similarly, a caregiver who is only interacting with a single patient need not undergo
this process. Furthermore, these protocols could be overridden for the sake of speed in the
event of an emergency—when protocols are generally observed, a single contact is unlikely
to transmit pathogens.
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The same principles of containment are behind biological membranes that prevent trans-
missions between parts of the body, and are the reason why the immune system is con-
centrated in the high-speed transport system of the body—the blood. It is the reason we
have regulations about plant and animal products crossing national borders. Conversely, the
absence of such boundary protections in an increasingly interconnected world has promoted
the rise of highly virulent new strains of pathogens and the risks of global pandemics.
Reducing the probability of transmission at each provider-to-patient contact by hand
washing and other protocols is still a good idea. At the same time, the flow of pathogens
through a hospital and overall transmission between sites can be dramatically reduced.
This can be done by creating additional levels of transmission-prevention at key internal
boundaries in the care facility and between care facilities.
The cost of hospital-based infections is high and using high-leverage methods to eliminate
them is the way to go. By instituting protocols at geographic domain boundaries, at low
cost, we can dramatically reduce their transmission.
VII. USE E-RECORDS FOR RESEARCH
Scientific principle—“Big data” research: Our increasingly complex world
yields massive quantities of data, and we now have the scientific knowledge to
perform pattern recognition on the data. Scientists are utilizing such “big data”
methods in areas as diverse as genomics, finance, and crime prevention. If made
available, the vast corpus of medical records should result in the discovery of
opportunities for advancement in medicine. This approach complements the
more traditional and more controlled framework of specially designed clinical
trials.
Electronic records, which have become increasingly prevalent in recent years, represent a
valuable repository of medical data. There are over 300 million people in the United States,
most of whom are receiving some sort of medical care. If anonymized medical records were
made available to researchers, these e-records could be leveraged to improve care at low cost.
In today’s quest to answer questions about medicine and human health, the large-scale,
controlled clinical trial is central. New drugs, surgical techniques, non-surgical interventions
and medical devices are typically tested in such studies, which require the creation of control
and test groups, controlling for confounding factors such as age and lifestyle, and the tracking
of patients.
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While these studies are essential for testing new drugs and interventions, not every med-
ical question can or should be tested using a clinical trial, given the human and monetary
resources that are required to conduct such studies.
Physicians and researchers already have other accepted ways of advancing medical knowl-
edge.
Observational studies and chart reviews typically analyze groups of patients based on the
condition displayed or the intervention used, and are often performed when large randomized
studies are infeasible. They can yield important results even without the controls needed
for clinical trials.
Physicians author case reports as a means of sharing their experiences with especially
instructive cases. These reports are regarded as valuable parts of the medical literature and
are a standard part of peer-reviewed medical journals. The medical field recognizes and
accepts knowledge gained through observational studies, chart reviews and case reports in
addition to controlled clinical studies.
With the use of e-records, the scope of chart reviews and the sharing of case reports are
dramatically expanded by many orders of magnitude. This represents a unique opportunity
to leverage vast amounts of newly available data to explore many medical questions.
Recently, the drug Vioxx was recalled due to side effects causing higher rates of heart
attack than comparable drugs. The recall took place one month after results of a study
using medical records from 1.4 million people were reported. This recall is one example of
how collecting and using data from actual patients can lead to medical advances.
Another example of data gathering that has led to significant recent advances is the on-
going Framingham Heart Study. This longitudinal study has tracked over 10,000 individuals
from three consecutive generations, monitoring their physical health and lifestyle choices, in
order to learn about cardiovascular disease. That information has been used by researchers
to make many advances, ranging from genetics to the role of social networks.
Many other studies have been based upon survey and medical reporting data collected
by the CDC. The data that could be made available dwarfs current resources.
As previously noted, medical care data is logged for many millions of people in the United
States. We can leverage the sheer volume of available data, combined with new pattern-
recognition methods and theoretical advances in data analysis, to increase our knowledge in
ways beyond the practical reach of other methods.
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FIG. 7: Research based on medical care data can help improve healthcare.
At the very least, analyzing these data could reveal previously unknown connections—
for example, between a particular medication, a bit of medical history, and a seemingly
unrelated disease—that would provide clues as to what questions should be pursued in
formal, controlled studies.
Also, since each person’s medical records may cover many years, we can learn about long
term effects much more easily and cost-effectively by analyzing these available data than
by conducting longitudinal studies on a particular therapy. Thus, we can use these data to
discover long-term effects that may otherwise not be detected at all.
Leveraging the availability of care data to increase our knowledge can’t and shouldn’t
replace controlled studies or physician experience. But it can be a powerful and cost-effective
tool, allowing us to utilize huge amounts of information and new methods of analysis to
increase our medical knowledge, improving our ability to treat patients and take care of
ourselves.
Data—be they from study results or individual experiences—are the raw material that
we use to build our medical knowledge. Gaining access to such a huge volume of new
information about human health is like inventing a microscope that can see objects that are
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much smaller, or a telescope that can see much farther away. This new data can lead to
many new discoveries.
Analyses of these data would be an important addition to the medical research toolkit,
augmenting traditional research methods. The governmental agencies that oversee vari-
ous aspects of healthcare practice and research should work with medical organizations to
make electronic medical records available in an anonymous, analyzable form. They should
encourage use of this vast, important resource to propel our knowledge of medicine forward.
VIII. PROMOTE “FIRST DAY” CELEBRATIONS
Scientific principle—Dynamics of collective behaviors: Behavioral
change can propagate through social network links. The importance of individual
behavioral choices to major public health problems and health more generally is
well known. Individual responsibility for health can be socially reinforced. The
power of social influence can be engaged to encourage individual healthy lifestyle
choices. The most effective way to achieve a large response from a system is to
engage its existing natural modes of activity. A yearly “First Day” celebration
leverages the existing culture of “New Year’s resolutions” and the natural yearly
cycle of renewal.
Any discussion about improving our healthcare system must acknowledge the important
role that is played by people caring for themselves and their loved ones. The most important
step we can take to improve the healthcare system is to support and inspire an informed
and widespread level of personal care.
Major health issues are related to behavior—smoking, alcohol consumption, diet, exercise,
even safe driving. Other health issues must be addressed partly through behavior, including
remembering to take medications.
Addressing public health problems such as obesity is at times viewed as the responsibility
of government, medical professionals or fast food chains. But these problems should also be
addressed by individuals working to change their own behavior.
Yet, when we do turn to individuals to improve their own health habits, we often overlook
the real potential in ensuring their success via support groups of friends and co-workers, and
via support mechanisms such as community institutions and social traditions.
Al Gore’s message calling for us all, as individuals and collectively, to be responsible for
our planet, resonates in this instance. We can all take responsibility to safeguard our health.
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We need a culture of healthy people in a healthy world.
How do we realize this vision?
Building on the tradition of setting aside a time for New Year’s resolutions, we can
promote lifestyle change with the use of “First Day” celebrations, which will convey health
information and will draw forth personal commitments to healthier living.
The fundamental purpose of these celebrations, resonating with “today is the first day
of the rest of your life” is to celebrate healthy lifestyles for the new year. This will promote
and reinforce our existing societal traditions and our recognition of the natural yearly cycle
as one of renewal and improvement.
Health is serious business, but people should take care of their health in a positive way,
mindful of new opportunities rather than focusing only on dangerous risks.
“First Day” also builds on “First Night,” the popular New Year’s Eve festivals full of
arts, family activities and cultural entertainment. Started in 1976, First Night built upon
people’s natural tendency to celebrate the new year, and channeled that impulse toward
constructive cultural activities and fun.
First Day should not be driven solely by individuals—companies, communities, towns,
cities, and states can all play a role. The Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC)
articulates a vision of health as pervading all aspects of life. We can leverage personal and
community participation to improve public health.
Perhaps surprisingly, Walmart has led the way. In 2007, Walmart launched a program in
which employees design and carry out “personal sustainability projects” including anything
from recycling at home to quitting smoking to getting more exercise. Originally focused on
the environment, participants naturally included personal health projects. Indeed, health
for oneself, one’s family, community, country and world are all linked—both in effect and in
desire and commitment for a better life.
Through this program, Walmart provides the framework for employees to exercise their
capabilities. Working alongside others to accomplish goals has a positive effect on what
people can accomplish. Employees self-monitor their progress for several weeks, and are
encouraged to make the improvements long term. Co-workers encourage one another to meet
their goals. Walmart’s popular program has been a great success, helping many employees
improve their lives.
This idea can be made into a national or global activity of personal and collective im-
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provement. Aligning it with New Year’s celebrations is a natural thing to do.
The preceding week, employers and government agencies can provide information and
events. Organizations of different types—companies, religious organizations, schools, towns,
states—can set up programs that encourage people to take responsibility for their own
health and lifestyle, and they can provide supportive communities toward that end. The
organizations themselves can undertake new commitments to improve social health and
community well-being.
Some people may want their goals and commitments to be private or to share them with
friends; others may be pleased to share them publicly. The key is for familiar institutions
and networks to support each person’s desire to improve his or her life and each person’s
journey toward better health.
Social network follow-up interactions can be planned. Internet-based and mobile de-
vice apps with calendars, reminders, and checklists can be developed to support people in
reaching their goals.
We can dramatically improve health by inspiring individual responsibility and action.
When people embrace their health as a personal opportunity and are also given community
support, they reveal tremendous power to make lasting improvements in their own lives and
each other’s.
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